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ABSTRACT
The experience of emotion and attempts to regulate it are universal human phenomena.
Emotion regulation is used to alter the affective intensity or tone, behaviors, and consequences
associated with an emotional experience. This study examined how two common emotional
regulation strategies (mindfulness and distraction) affect attentional performance following a
negative mood induction via film. While previous literature has compared emotional regulation
strategies’ effects on a variety of outcomes, the efficacy of these strategies to reduce cognitive
interference caused by negative mood has not been examined. Both mindfulness and distraction
are hypothesized to occur through the Attention Deployment mechanism of the Attention phase
of emotional experience (Gross, 2014), but they have not been directly compared. Participants
received a brief (six-minute) training in mindfulness or distraction or will receive no instructions
(control condition). Following an exposure to two sadness-inducing films, they completed a
cognitive testing battery, which includes a continuous performance test of attention, a symboldigit coding task, and an emotionally valenced Stroop paradigm. Despite pre-test differences in
self-ratings of sadness and happiness, the mindfulness training somewhat ameliorated the
expected decrease in happiness following the negative mood induction. Mindfulness training also
was associated with a trend towards better performance across several variables of the
continuous performance test and self-corrections on the Stroop task. Individuals who received no
emotion regulation instructions tended to perform more slowly on several cards of the Stroop
task. Results provided limited support for efficacy of mindfulness training in reducing
consequences of a negative mood induction on affect and cognitive performance. Future studies
should examine the effect of longer-term interventions for emotion regulation and cognitive
v

performance and more closely explore the path of emotional experience after emotion regulation
interventions.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
As long as humans have had emotions, they have sought to control them. Theories and
strategies of regulating emotion have been debated since the advent of psychoanalysis. As early
as 1896, Sigmund Freud described theories of how emotional regulation occurs, as well as how
its processes may become pathological (Freud & Gay, 1995; Freud & Strachey, 1989). NeoFreudians described a variety of defense mechanisms individuals may use to protect themselves
against painful emotions, thoughts, or memories (Cramer, 2000; A. Freud, 1946; Paulhus,
Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997; Vaillant, 1992). Researchers from other theoretical orientations
have examined emotional regulation in relation to psychopathology, cognition, development, and
social bonding (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Cassidy, 1994; Cole, Michel, &
Teti, 1994; Gross, 2002; Richards & Gross, 2000).
Sub-disciplines within psychology take varied approaches in studying emotional
regulation. Social psychology generally has examined emotional regulation strategies that can be
manipulated to increase or decrease response to stimuli, in addition to examining the social
consequences of emotional regulation strategies (Gross, 2002; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, &
White, 1987). Clinical psychology emphasizes the adaptive and maladaptive emotional
regulation strategies of clinical and non-clinical populations (Berking et al., 2008; Blackledge &
Hayes, 2001; Gross, 1998b). Developmental psychology views emotional regulation as a lifelong
learning process, within which appropriate strategies are encouraged or discouraged based on
numerous biological, social, and cultural factors (Cole et al., 1994; Eisenberg, Spinrad, &
Eggum, 2010; Kopp, 1989; Thompson, 1991). While these approaches contribute substantially to
1

their discipline, research that integrates experimental findings and clinical impact has been less
prevalent.
Defining Emotional Regulation
It is important to distinguish between the overarching concept of emotional regulation
and the specific strategies individuals use to accomplish this goal. Thompson (1991) defines
emotional regulation as “the extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring,
evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions.” Gross (1998b) and Thompson (1994) note that
these processes may be effortful or automatic, conscious or unconscious, used to dampen or
heighten the emotional experience, to lengthen or shorten an emotional experience, and may
occur at various points during the emotional experience, with the general purpose of
accomplishing one’s goals. This definition is useful to describe the concept of emotional
regulation outside of a specific theoretical framework.
The widely accepted course of emotion experience is the gradual fading of an emotion’s
strength and salience over time – occurring less frequently and with lesser intensity. For
example, undergraduates asked to express feelings about an emotionally salient memory
gradually expressed fewer thoughts over time than those initially asked to suppress emotional
reaction to the memory (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). This process, identified as habituation by
behavioral theorists, results in decreased intensity of a stimulus experience following repeated
exposure (Harris, 1943; Thompson & Spencer, 1966).
Researchers diverge in their views on the process of emotional regulation, positing at
least three separate models of this process. The interacting cognitive subsystems (ICS) theory,
hypothesized by Barnard and Teasdale, states that specific details of a situation are combined
2

through higher-level processing, activating a pattern or “schema,” which leads to the creation of
an emotional experience (Barnard, 1985; Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Teasdale, 1999). These
authors suggest that the meaning derived from a given situation likely differs based on the
individual’s personality and previous experience. Further, in order to regulate or change an
emotional experience, an “alternative model” must exist and be activated to modify the existing
activated schema.
Teasdale (1999) hypothesized three predominant modes of emotion processing (mindless
emoting, conceptualizing/doing, mindful experience/being), which differ based on whether
emotional input and its implications are directly experienced or modulated. He likens mindless
emoting to expression of emotion without monitoring its longevity or understanding the cyclical,
changeable nature of emotions. Conceptualizing of emotions is defined as using only goaloriented approaches to dealing with emotions, rather than considering one’s personal attachment
to thoughts and feelings. Thirdly, he defines mindful experience/being as internal reflection on
experience without either being immersed in or ignoring one’s emotional experience. Based on
the mode of emotional processing used, the experience of the emotion may be vastly different.
An individual’s perception and understanding of an emotional event also are emphasized
in an informational processing framework of understanding emotion regulation. As proposed by
Garber, Braafladt, and Zeman (1991), several stages occur during an emotional event that, taken
together, create the emotional experience: perception, interpretation, goal setting, response
generation, response evaluation, and enactment. In the perception stage, emotional activation that
may need to be altered is recognized. Next, during the interpretation stage, the individual
identifies the cause of the emotional event and who is responsible for altering it. During goal3

setting, the individual determines if the affect needs to be regulated, then the steps to respond to
the emotional stimulus are created during the response generation stage. Next, during the
response evaluation stage, the possible outcomes or consequences of the generated responses is
considered, and during the last stage (enactment), the behavioral response is implemented.
Garber et al. (1991) hypothesize that the availability and modification of information input
(which can be affected by psychological disorders, as well as emotion regulation strategies)
determine an individual’s emotional experience.
Gross (1998b, 2014) proposes the “modal model” of emotion regulation, which
emphasizes three components of emotional regulation: the goal or purpose of the emotion
regulation, the strategy attempted to achieve this goal, and the eventual outcome of the strategy.
The author suggests that while the emotional experience moves forward in time, it also
influences future situations and affects, providing the opportunity to alter emotions.
Emotion Regulation Strategies
There are an infinite number of ways to regulate one’s emotional experience, whether
through internal or external means, automatic or effortful processes, or cognitive, emotional, or
behavioral changes. This paper will focus on several strategies used to regulate emotion through
internal, cognitive processes of altering affective experience. Commonly identified emotion
regulation strategies include acceptance, reappraisal, putting into perspective, problem-solving,
positive refocusing, refocus on planning, rumination, suppression, avoidance, self-blame, otherblame, and catastrophizing (Aldao et al., 2010; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; Garnefski
et al., 2002). One obstacle to generalizability of findings in this area is the variety of
hypothesized strategies and operational definitions. Within the theoretical framework of the
4

modal model, Gross (2014) proposes that regulation strategies be grouped based on when they
are used during the emotional experience. He proposes a major division between antecedentfocused and response-focused regulation strategies, with the former being alterations in the
situation, details, or perceptions of the emotional experience and the latter being modifications to
one’s emotions, thoughts, or behaviors following the initiation of the emotional response (Gross,
1998a). The modal model organization of regulation strategies further divides strategies based on
their specific effect on a mechanism within the emotional experience. Gross (2014) labeled
strategies targeting Response Modulation as response-focused, while all strategies earlier in the
emotional experience are referred to as antecedent-focused.
For example, Gross suggests that distraction targets Attentional Deployment to reduce
conscious exposure to negative emotion, while reappraisal works on Cognitive Change.
Researchers have also suggested that individuals do not utilize only one means of emotional
regulation, but instead use a variety of strategies based on personality and situational factors
(Gross & John, 2003). Following are findings related to the most commonly studied regulation
strategies: avoidance, distraction, mindfulness, reappraisal, suppression and acceptance. They are
presented based on the organization hypothesized by Gross (2014) and highlighted below (Fig.
1), with the earlier strategies first, followed by those occurring later in the emotional experience.
Avoidance
Avoidance is a regulation strategy in which an individual denies or refuses to
acknowledge an emotional experience or its consequences in order to change the strength or
frequency of distress associated with the situation (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl,
1996). This strategy can be viewed as an attentional regulation strategy or a behavioral strategy
5

Figure 1. Timeline of emotional experience and regulation strategies (adapted from the modal
model organization of emotion regulation strategies: Gross, 2014). Each phase of the emotional
experience occurs during any affective event. Individuals have the capacity to regulate their
emotions by altering the mechanism by which information is received during the relevant phase
of the emotional experience. Some strategies occur before the full emotional experience occurs
(antecedent-focused), while others occur after the full emotional experience has begun (responsefocused). In addition, a variety of strategies exist to regulate emotional experience. In the above
figure, they are divided based on which mechanism they alter within the affective experience.
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(i.e. reducing emotional distress by modifying or avoiding triggering situations; Gross, 1998b;
Hayes et al., 1996; Luoma, Hayes, & Walser, 2007). The temporal course of attentional
avoidance begins with sharp behavioral and physiological responses to a triggering stimulus,
followed by an extended period of avoiding the emotion through multiple modalities (cognitive,
attentional, affective), reducing the conscious experience of emotional upset (Derakshan,
Eysenck, & Myers, 2007).
Avoidance is an effective means of reducing short-term distress without taxing cognitive
resources (Roth & Cohen, 1986; Sheppes & Gross, 2012; Wegner & Gold, 1995). Both
situational avoidance and emotional avoidance may be useful in avoiding hazardous or
emotionally distressing experiences (Hayes et al., 1996). However, long-term use of this
strategy, as with suppression, does not allow habituation to the emotional experience (Lazarus,
1998; Rachman, 1981). Frequent use of attentional avoidance predicts heightened reported
emotional response to anxiety-provoking stimuli, but not heightened cognitive or physical
symptoms of anxiety (Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; Karekla, Forsyth, & Kelly,
2004; Sloan, 2004; Spira, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Feldner, 2004). Further, individuals who report a
high level of emotional avoidance initially are likely to report fewer positive experiences and
greater negative affective experiences over time (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006).
The cause of this relationship remains unclear: are individuals led to use avoidance due to high
emotional reactivity, or does heightened emotional avoidance causes high emotional reactivity?
Distraction
Distraction works to alter emotion by focusing attention away from emotionally
activating stimuli during an affective event (Gross, 2014; Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes,
7

Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011). Focusing on distressing aspects of a stimuli results in higher selfreported distress and stronger neural reactivity than focusing on neutral aspects of the stimuli
(Thiruchselvam, Hajcak, & Gross, 2012). This strategy occurs through the Attentional
Deployment mechanism in the Attention phase of emotional experience, altering one’s
attentional focus to increase or decrease the target affect (Gross, 2014; McRae et al., 2010).
Distraction can occur using internal or external stimuli (Sheppes & Gross, 2012). For
example, individuals report focusing on counter-valenced thoughts to reduce negative emotion
(e.g. thinking about something positive to reduce feelings of sadness; Wenzlaff, Wegner, &
Roper, 1988). Distraction can also be focused outward; directing attention towards less
unpleasant areas of distressing images results in lessened emotional and neurological response
than focusing on highly distressing areas of the image (Dunning & Hajcak, 2009). This
regulation strategy has been found to occur early in the emotional experience and to rapidly
reduce emotional distress in the short term (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). When allowed to choose
an emotion regulation strategy in a highly emotionally distressing situation, individuals used
distraction more frequently than other regulation strategies (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross,
2011). Distraction can be effectively used to reduce perception of pain and reduce memory
encoding during a distressing emotional experience without significant cognitive, neurological,
or physiological disruption (Bantick et al., 2002; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, 2008).
However, frequent use of distraction (as well as suppression) to regulate emotion has
been linked to increased response in anxiety-provoking situations (Spira et al., 2004). While
distraction can effectively modulate emotion initially, it does not allow for habituation to the
emotional experience (Rachman, 1981). This may account for heightened emotional and
8

neurological response during re-exposure to affectively-charged stimuli after previously
distracting oneself from it (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).
Mindfulness
Mindfulness is an attentional regulation strategy in which an individual attempts to focus
on present emotional experience with openness and curiosity and without judgment or attempting
to change it (Bishop et al., 2004; Sheppes & Gross, 2012). This practice evolved from Eastern
meditation techniques and Buddhist traditions (Bishop et al., 2004; Hạnh, 1976), as well as
techniques from psychological orientations including behaviorism, CBT, and psychodynamic
psychotherapy (Martin, 1997). Commonly, in therapeutic practice, it is linked with acceptance in
a few different ways: non-judgmental acceptance of emotions as a necessary component of
mindfulness, mindfulness as one component of the larger goal of acceptance in everyday life
situations, as two terms for the same strategy, or as two separate emotion regulation strategies.
For the purpose of this paper, mindfulness and acceptance will be discussed separately, as they
have been hypothesized to be used at different points in the emotional experience (Sheppes &
Gross, 2012).
Short-term and long-term use of mindfulness have been shown to reduce self-reported
negative affect, but findings on its effect on physiological arousal have been equivocal. Some
studies showing decreased physiological response to emotional distress following mindfulness
training (Tang et al., 2009), while other studies show no difference in physiological response in
mindfulness versus control groups (Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007).
Self-reported use of mindfulness is negatively correlated with use of suppression and avoidance
(Hayes & Feldman, 2004; Kumar, Feldman, & Hayes, 2008) and with distress related to
9

emotional regulation (Hill & Updegraff, 2012). Mindfulness also has been positively correlated
with emotional awareness and differentiation (Hill & Updegraff, 2012) and reduced fatigue and
anxiety (Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010; Zeidan, Johnson, Gordon, &
Goolkasian, 2010). Long-term use of mindfulness has been associated with greater positive
affect and psychological well-being (Davidson et al., 2003; Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, &
Finkel, 2008; Ortner et al., 2007).
Reappraisal
The goal of reappraisal is to transform the meaning of an emotional event by altering
one’s interpretation of it (Ochsner et al., 2004; Sheppes & Gross, 2012). This strategy seems to
occur late in the emotional process – during the Appraisal phase – as hypothesized by Gross
(2014) and demonstrated through neuroimaging (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). However,
reappraisal is believed to occur before the full experience of the emotion, while suppression (a
more behavioral strategy) occurs after the emotion has occurred – an effortful attempt to change
the emotion after the fact (Forsyth, Eifert, & Barrios, 2006; Gross, Richards, & John, 2006).
The process of reappraisal begins once the emotional stimuli has been attended to, as the
stimulus is beginning to enter cognition and gain meaning. At that point, the meaning or
importance of the event is re-examined, and in the case of down-regulation of negative emotions,
its impact is now viewed as less severe or personal (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). This process is
believed to be effective because it allows experience of the emotion, as well as some habituation
to it, without allowing one to be overwhelmed by its consequences (Macnamara, Ochsner, &
Hajcak, 2011; Walter et al., 2009; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008). Forsyth et al. (2006) hypothesize
that reappraisal can be more flexible than other regulation strategies, taking many possible forms
10

in an attempt to change one’s understanding of an emotion. For example, if an individual is
attempting to alter feelings of anger, they may reappraise their anger as healthy aggression, selfrighteousness, or motivation for change; suppression can only allow the individual to reduce
visible expression of the emotion.
Research has identified numerous positive short-term and long-term consequences of
reappraisal. This strategy is effective in regulating emotional experience, while still providing an
opportunity to habituate to distress (Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Sheppes & Gross, 2012). Use of
reappraisal has been linked to lower intensity and less frequent experience of anger (Martin &
Dahlen, 2005; Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011). It has not been shown to significantly
increase mental burden or physiological arousal (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Ray, McRae,
Ochsner, & Gross, 2010). While use of reappraisal and suppression were reported at
commensurate rates by an undergraduate sample (Gross et al., 2006), individuals who frequently
utilize reappraisal tend to have closer friendships and be better liked by peers. Reappraisers also
tended to show fewer symptoms of depression, higher life satisfaction, increased sense of
control, and higher self-esteem (Gross & John, 2003; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008).
Few criticisms of reappraisal have emerged, although this strategy occurs later in the
emotional experience than some other regulation strategies, and it does come with some
cognitive cost (Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). One study which allowed individuals to choose the
regulation strategy they used found that participants were more likely to use reappraisal than
other strategies to deal with low-intensity emotional stimuli (e.g. pictures of sad faces that have
been rated as slightly emotionally activating; (Sheppes et al., 2011). This suggests that while this
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strategy is viewed as an appropriate tool to deal with some emotional distress, individuals tend to
revert to other regulation strategies when in a highly activating emotional situation.
Suppression
Suppression is defined as a strategy that attempts to inhibit emotionally expressive
behavior (Gross & Levenson, 1993; John & Gross, 2004). Some common examples of this
strategy include suppressing nervousness about giving a speech, keeping a “poker face” during a
card game, or acting unaffected by the hurtful words of a romantic partner (John & Gross, 2004;
Sheppes & Gross, 2012). Suppression is generally viewed as a behavioral means of controlling
emotion – an effortful attempt to change the emotion after the affective experience has begun
(Forsyth et al., 2006; Gross et al., 2006). In Gross’s (2014) modal model of emotional regulation,
suppression is used late in the emotional experience (targeting the Response Modulation
mechanism of the Response phase).
The strategy of suppression can be used to alter affective and cognitive experiences, as
well as overt behavior. In the seminal study on the effects of thought suppression, Wegner et al.
(1987) found that when undergraduate students were asked to suppress thoughts and
vocalizations about a white bear, they later experienced an increase in such thoughts: a
phenomenon labeled the “rebound effect.” Similarly, individuals asked to suppress the
experience of pain during a cold-pressor test reported greater pain during the recovery period
than subjects in a distraction or monitoring condition (Cioffi & Holloway, 1993).
The finding that initial suppression can lead to subsequent greater expression has been
examined with emotionally salient material as well (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). Individuals are
generally able to suppress thoughts and emotions, when directed to (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994;
12

Wenzlaff et al., 1988). One hypothesis is that suppression is an attempt to distance oneself from
distressing thoughts or emotions, allowing the individual to reduce the immediate internal
experience and outward demonstration of negative emotion. However, this process does not
allow habituation, a requisite part of the emotional experience (Rachman, 1981). Paradoxically,
the individual experiences the “rebound effect,” experiencing distress longer or with greater
intensity (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). In laboratory studies, individuals directed to suppress
emotions often report a delayed, heightened level of arousal compared to individuals allowed to
express their emotions (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006a; Eifert & Heffner,
2003; Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; Gross, 1998a; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, &
Asnaani, 2009; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). Findings
have been mixed with regard to physiological arousal and suppression: some studies have found
that individuals instructed to use suppression demonstrate increased physiological arousal (e.g.
heart rate, skin conductance, vasoconstriction) compared with individuals utilizing other
emotional regulation strategies (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a; Gross, 1998a; Hofmann et al.,
2009; Richards & Gross, 1999), while others have found no significant differences in
physiological arousal between emotional suppression and emotional acceptance conditions
(Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Feldner et al., 2003; Karekla et al., 2004; Levitt et al., 2004). In
laboratory experiments incorporating social interactions, individuals instructed to engage in
suppression reported an increased in negative emotion and poorer communication than
individuals asked to use reappraisal or who received no instructions. Both subjects in the
suppression group and their interactional partners exhibited heightened blood pressure response
during the task (Butler et al., 2003).
13

In addition to documented short-term negative effects, the long-term use of suppression
has been associated with stronger negative emotional reactions, fewer positive emotional
experiences, lower self-esteem, lower life satisfaction, decreased sense of control, and poorer
interpersonal relationships (English & John, 2013; Gross & John, 2003). However, despite welldocumented negative consequences of suppression, this regulation strategy is very common in
everyday interactions; a sample of undergraduates reported using emotional suppression 3.8
times per week on average – the same frequency as reported use of reappraisal (Gross et al.,
2006). There are few studies that demonstrate positive effects of suppression. Suppression may
allow short-term reduction of negative emotion, greater affective self-control, and increased
ability for impression management in social situations. Frequent use of suppression has been
shown in some studies to correlate with lower levels of distress and more resilience from
negative life events (Bonanno & Field, 2001; Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, & Vlahov, 2006;
Bonanno, Noll, Putnam, O'Neill, & Trickett, 2003; Seery, Silver, Holman, Ence, & Chu, 2008).
Acceptance
Acceptance attempts to regulate emotion by being curious and open to the experience
without attempting to actively control it or ruminate on its consequences (Sheppes & Gross,
2012). While similar to mindfulness, acceptance is hypothesized to occur through the Response
Modulation mechanism of the Response phase of emotional experience, during which
individuals select how to exhibit the emotion and begin to understand the implications of the
emotion (Gross, 2014). While these two strategies (mindfulness and acceptance) work similarly
to allow an individual greater awareness of affect and thoughts, they target different phases of
emotional experience: mindfulness targets attention towards internal processes, while acceptance
14

aims to increase understanding and thoughtfulness about one’s response to the emotional
situation. The process of acceptance begins with the experience of the emotion, followed by a
conscious or unconscious effort to view and accept without judgment the experience and its
consequences (Hofmann et al., 2009). Because this process occurs later in the emotional
experience than other regulation strategies, acceptance frequently is directed at the consequences
of emotion, rather than attempting to change the affective and situational input.
Use of acceptance results in lower self-reported distress to emotionally activating
material (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004). This strategy also is associated with
lessened initial physiological response and quicker return to baseline after exposure to distressing
material in some studies (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006b; Dunn, Billotti,
Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009), but not in others (Eifert & Heffner, 2003). Levitt et al. (2004)
found that individuals using acceptance reported being more willing to engage in a similar
experience in the future, suggesting that use of acceptance may have far-reaching implications
for later situation selection.
Most studies conceptualize acceptance as a positive regulation strategy, but a few studies
have identified negative consequences of using this strategy. Acceptance was related to higher
depression scores in an adult and an elderly non-clinical sample (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). In
another study, acceptance was positively correlated with adaptive anger control, but also was
found to correlate with depression, stress, and unhealthy anger suppression (Martin & Dahlen,
2005). One explanation for these findings is a dichotomy within this strategy: maladaptive
acceptance resulting in passivity or learned helplessness in response to negative affect compared
to acceptance as understanding and ownership of the emotion and its consequences (Garnefski &
15

Kraaij, 2006; Wilson, 1996). It may be that indiscriminant use of acceptance (e.g. applying it to
all emotional experiences) can result in acceptance of feelings that are negative, inappropriate,
excessive, or otherwise unhealthy.
Emotion Regulation and Psychological Distress
Research on strategies of emotion regulation, including many of the studies examined
above, typically has used non-clinical, undergraduate samples and self-report or experimental
designs. However, an important offshoot of this area is examination of relationships between
emotional regulation strategies and psychopathology. Psychopathology was significantly
associated with lower emotional regulation skills in a sample of German inpatients, and low
scores on an emotion regulation skills questionnaire predicted membership in the clinical sample
compared to a control sample (Berking et al., 2008). A meta-analysis by Aldao et al. (2010)
identified the emotional regulation strategies of avoidance, suppression, and rumination as being
highly correlated with psychopathology, while problem-solving and reappraisal were negatively
correlated with psychopathology. Garnefski et al. (2002) found that within a clinical sample,
individuals were more likely to use rumination and acceptance, while individuals in the nonclinical group were more likely to use positive reappraisal.
Anxiety Disorders
Anxiety disorders have been an area of focus in the emotion regulation literature. Anxiety
is often viewed a decreased ability to withstand and regulate negative emotions (e.g. worry in
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, the feared stimuli in Specific Phobia). Extreme use of avoidance
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is identified as a symptom in specific phobia, agoraphobia, and social phobia, as well as in posttraumatic stress disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014).
Self-reported emotional dysregulation correlated strongly with chronic worry and
predicted membership in a GAD sample, compared to a control sample (Salters-Pedneault,
Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006). Symptoms of anxiety have been found to positively
correlate with use of avoidance, rumination, and suppression and to negatively correlate with
problem-solving and acceptance (Aldao et al., 2010; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006). Individuals
with anxiety are less able to suppress emotionally troubling material than healthy controls
(Becker, Rinck, Roth, & Margraf, 1998) and may engage in self-examination or mindfulness to a
pathological degree (e.g. hypervigilance to bodily experience in panic disorder; Gross & Jazaieri,
2014). However, another view of anxiety is that worried or ruminative thoughts are a response to
emotional distress and actually are a means of avoidance of uncertainty or lack of control
(Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Rassin, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000).
Researchers hypothesize that emotional avoidance may be a strong moderator between
anxiety and a variety of other variables, including coping strategies, response styles, and
perceived control (Kashdan et al., 2006). Another potential moderator is the perceived
acceptability of emotions; among individuals with anxiety, belief that emotions are unacceptable
has a strong indirect effect on the relationship between suppression and the intensity of negative
emotion, although this finding was driven by the female participants in this diagnostic category
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a).
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Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Obsessive-compulsive disorder has been highlighted as a thought dysregulation disorder,
in which obsessive thoughts are unable to be effectively managed, leading to compulsive
undoing behaviors. Use of thought suppression is positively correlated with severity and
frequency of OCD symptoms (Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Stapert, 1999; Wegner &
Zanakos, 1994). One hypothesis is that individuals with OCD are less able to suppress intrusive
thoughts initially, but this theory is only partially supported in the literature (Abramowitz, Tolin,
& Street, 2001; Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997; Janeck & Calamari, 1999). A counter-intuitive
finding of emotion regulation strategies is that individuals with OCD are more likely than
healthy controls to use reappraisal, while controls were most likely to use distraction (Amir et al.,
1997). It is impossible to assume directionality from this study, but it is possible that this finding
demonstrates an evolution which occurs in the course of OCD, where distraction is ineffective in
the face of obsessive thinking, leading to unhealthy reappraisal of distressing thoughts as being
controlled through compulsive behaviors.
Major Depressive Disorder
Major depressive disorder has also been linked to deficits in emotion regulation.
Researchers hypothesize that major depressive disorder is caused by cycles of negative thought
without the regulation capabilities to break those patterns (Teasdale, 1999; Teasdale, Segal, &
Williams, 1995). Depression is positively correlated with use of avoidance, rumination, and
suppression and was negatively correlated with problem-solving and reappraisal (Aldao et al.,
2010; Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Individuals with
depression also demonstrate increased rumination, especially with negative or depressogenic
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content (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Teasdale, 1999). The relationship between depression and use
of distraction is less clear; mildly depressed individuals directed to use distraction showed a
significant reduction in depressive affect, while more highly depressed individuals did not show
similar relative relief following the distraction procedure (Fennell, Teasdale, Jones, & Damlé,
1987).
Individuals with a history of depression may engage in deliberate suppression of
depressogenic thoughts in an attempt to reduce relapse, but such strategies are more likely to fail
over time or with increased cognitive burden (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Depressed individuals
also demonstrated increased ability to suppress positive thoughts and lessened ability to suppress
negative thoughts (Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). This
difference may occur for a variety of reasons, including poorer cognitive efficiency, reduced
salience or recall of positive thoughts, or deficient coping strategies, all of which have been
linked to depression (Fennell & Teasdale, 1987; Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann, Siemer,
& Gotlib, 2007; Teasdale, 1999). The hypothesis that depressed individuals have lessened ability
to suppress negative affect has been supported by neuroimaging findings of higher neural
activation during a suppression task in individuals with severe depression, compared to those
with mild depression or healthy controls (Erk et al., 2010).
Psychological Interventions Targeting Emotion Regulation
Long-Term Treatments
Numerous long-term psychological treatments have been developed that focused
exclusively or in part on improving emotional regulation capabilities (Greenberg & Johnson,
1988; Whelton, 2004). Various labels have been applied to treatment exclusively targeted
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emotion regulation, including emotion-focused therapy and cognitive-emotional-behavioral
therapy (CEBT). Individual, family, group, and school-based therapies targeting emotional
regulation have demonstrated improved psychological, emotional, and health outcomes (Smyth
& Arigo, 2009; Suveg, Kendall, Comer, & Robin, 2006). Other interventions have been
developed, but have not yet demonstrated empirical efficacy in meeting treatment goals or
emotional regulation improvement (Corstorphine, 2006; Stanley et al., 2009).
Several empirically-validated long-term psychological treatments have components
designed to improve emotion regulation strategies. Cognitive-behavioral therapy is hypothesized
to effect change by identifying and modifying negative automatic thoughts and behaviors, an
antecedent-regulation approach (Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Campbell-Sills & Barlow,
2007; Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008; Tarrier, 2010). Improvement in CBT is positively
correlated with improvement in emotional regulation abilities in samples of adult inpatients,
children, and adolescents (Berking et al., 2008; Cohen, Berliner, & Mannarino, 2010; Slee,
Spinhoven, Garnefski, & Arensman, 2008; Suveg, Sood, Comer, & Kendall, 2009), although the
directionality of this effect is unclear. Neuroimaging before and after CBT treatment confirm
alternations in neurological functioning in areas hypothesized to be important in emotional
regulation (Beauregard, 2007). Berking et al. (2008) found that CBT combined with emotional
regulation training was even more clinically effective and effective at improving these skills than
an only-CBT treatment. Interestingly, within this study, significant improvement of acceptance
skills predicted clinical improvement in both conditions, although this regulation strategy is not
emphasized as much in CBT as in several contemporary theories discussed below.

20

Third-wave cognitive therapies such as Dialectical-Behavioral Therapy (DBT) and
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) emphasize use of mindfulness, reappraisal, and
acceptance as means of reducing emotional distress (Hayes & Pierson, 2005; Hofmann, Sawyer,
& Fang, 2010; Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, Allmon, & Heard, 1991; Robins, Ivanoff, &
Linehan, 2001). Unlike CBT, which emphasizes modification of negative thoughts and emotions,
ACT and DBT focus on mindfulness and acceptance strategies (Hofmann et al., 2010).
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) therapies seek to improve psychological health
through increasing mindful examination of thoughts and feelings without labeling or judging
those experiences, and these interventions have demonstrated efficacy (Brantley, 2005; KabatZinn et al., 1992; Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995). Neuroimaging suggests that MBSR
may increase emotional regulation abilities and decrease emotional reactivity in relevant brain
structures (Goldin & Gross, 2010).
An intriguing new area of research in psychological treatment and emotion regulation is
in attentional training programs, generally prescribed for treatment of anxiety disorders and
PTSD (Hakamata et al., 2010; Mohlman, 2004). These treatments are hypothesized to reduce
negative affect by training individuals’ attention away from distress-inducing cues and towards
more balanced environmental attention (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Heeren, Reese,
McNally, & Philippot, 2012; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). These strategies
likely influence emotional regulation during the Attention Modulation mechanism of the
Attention phase of the modal model organization, although the few studies specifically
examining such training’s effect on emotion regulation have produced equivocal findings
(Johnson, 2009; Wadlinger, 2009; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2010).
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Brief Interventions
Several methods have been used to train emotion regulation strategies in one session. A
common method is providing verbal, written, or recorded directions to participants to describe
the regulation strategy and instruct them about how to use it. This strategy has been used to train
a variety of emotion regulation strategies, including distraction, reappraisal, suppression, and
acceptance (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b; Feldner et al., 2003; Gross, 1998a; Hofmann et al.,
2009; Levitt et al., 2004; Szasz et al., 2011; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).
Experiential methods have also been utilized to facilitate particular emotion regulation
strategies. For a one-session training of acceptance, Eifert and Heffner (2003) used both verbal
instructions and a physical experience of using a Chinese finger trap as a metaphor for
ineffective struggle against emotions. Arch and Craske (2006) exposed participants to a 15minute focused breathing exercise to induce mindful self-focus. There have not been studies to
directly compare descriptive and experiential methods of training emotion regulation strategies,
so it remains unclear whether one method is more effective than another.
While brief interventions, like those discussed above, can produce between-group
differences – believed to result from the different regulation strategies trained – it is difficult to
know with certainty that participants both understand and use the strategy correctly. Direct
quizzing on instructions, participant explanation of how they are implementing strategies, and
manipulation checks are utilized to ensure adherence to experimental instructions (Eifert &
Heffner, 2003; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).

22

Cognitive Deficits Associated with Emotional Regulation
A recently developed focus of research is the effect of emotion regulation on cognitive
performance, including executive functioning, memory and attention. Such studies examine how
short-term or long-term use of specific emotion regulation strategies is related to performance on
cognitive tasks. The most widely studied effects of emotional regulation have been in the domain
of memory.
Individuals who endorse frequent use of suppression in everyday life tend to have poorer
memories, based on both self-report and assessment, while there was no memory effect observed
in frequent users of reappraisal (Richards & Gross, 2000). Experimentally-induced suppression
has been found to cause poorer memory for both highly and mildly emotional verbal stimuli
compared to reappraisal or receiving no instruction (Richards & Gross, 1999; Richards & Gross,
2000). Participants in the suppression condition also reported less confidence in their memory
following these tests. This suggests that the experience of suppression provides some cues to the
individual that their memory of the task has been impaired. It may be that suppression causes
general cognitive interference, which results in poorer memory processing, as well as poorer
thought suppression abilities. For example, during a list-learning task, dysphoric undergraduates
demonstrated increased interference from a list of words they were supposed to suppress,
compared to healthy controls (Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). Interesting, Richards and Gross (2000)
did not find any effect of emotional regulation on visual memory, suggesting that this
interference may function only in the verbal domain. The authors suggest that suppression may
be accomplished through mental verbalizations, which creates interference when the individual
also is asked to encode, store, and recall verbal information.
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Emotional regulation strategies have been used to improve memory performance. For
example, in a sample of depressed and dysphoric individuals, Watkins, Teasdale, and Williams
(2000) examined the effect of distraction or rumination on recall of “overgeneral” memories:
defined as recall of categories of events or extended events, rather than detailed or singular
experiences (Mark, Williams, & Dritschel, 1992). Frequent recall of such memories has been
found to correlate with poorer prognosis of recovery from depression (Brittlebank, Scott,
Williams, & Ferrier, 1993) and may represent stable, negative views of the world which
contribute to the development and maintenance of depression, as hypothesized by Beck (1979,
2005). Watkins et al. (2000) found that participants demonstrated fewer instances of
“overgeneral” memory if they completed a distraction task prior to a memory test, compared to
completing a rumination-induction task.
Several studies have examined the effects of short-term and long-term mindfulness on
cognitive abilities. Following a ten-day intensive mindfulness retreat, participants demonstrated
improved working memory and sustained attention, compared to control group (Chambers, Lo,
& Allen, 2008). Similar results were found for a four-session mindfulness meditation training,
including improved visuo-spatial processing, working memory, and executive functioning
(Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, et al., 2010).
Mindfulness training also has been shown to reduce interference on the emotional Stroop
task (Ortner et al., 2007), a variant of the commonly used verbal interference paradigm (Stroop,
1935; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Interference on Stroop paradigms have been
identified across a range of psychological disorders, including anxiety disorders (Becker, Rinck,
Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985;
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Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993); PTSD (Bremner et al., 2004; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, &
Zeitlin, 1990); and eating disorders (Dobson & Dozois, 2004; Smeets, Roefs, van Furth, &
Jansen, 2008). Results of emotional Stroop paradigms in depression have been less clear, with
many studies finding no difference in performance for depressed and non-depressed samples
(Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, &
Mathews, 1993). Gotlib and Cane (1987) did find evidence of emotional Stroop interference in a
sample of recently hospitalized, depressed individuals, but upon retesting at discharge, this effect
was no longer significant. Interference on the emotional Stroop is hypothesized to occur due to
momentary distraction caused by an attempt to suppress emotionally relevant material, leading to
poorer inhibition (increased errors and slowed performance) throughout the task (Buhle, Wager,
& Smith, 2010). The impact of strategies of emotion regulation on Stroop task performance has
not been systematically examined; however, it is not a far reach to suggest that more effective
means of regulating emotion would correlate with lessened interference on an emotional Stroop
paradigm.
Decreased inhibition abilities have been widely implicated in cognitive disruption due to
mood. Joorman and colleagues have hypothesized that rumination, an experience common across
a variety of diagnoses, disrupts normal cognitive inhibition processes, leading to poorer
inhibition, stronger priming of distressing concepts, and decreased ability to clear unwanted
information from working memory (Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib,
2008). Faulty cognitive inhibition of negative material has been shown to be related to increased
use of rumination and decreased use of reappraisal in both healthy and depressed samples
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2010).
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One potential explanation for worsened performance on cognitive tasks among those
asked to alter their emotions is the ego-depletion model hypothesized by Baumeister and
colleagues (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). They posit that regulation of
emotions requires use of mental resources, leaving fewer resources to draw upon during
cognitive tasks. This theory is similar to the processing efficiency theory of Eysenck and Calvo
(1992), which suggests that the experience of anxiety reduces working memory and processing
capacity, resulting in increased effort being necessary to maintain commensurate cognitive
performance. These theories were developed to account for worsened cognitive performance
associated with psychological disorders, but their hypotheses translate well to research on
emotion regulation.
The current study examines two common emotion regulation strategies (mindfulness and
distraction) and their effect on cognitive performance following a negative mood induction.
These strategies were selected for comparison because both are hypothesized to occur through
the Attentional Deployment mechanism during the Attention phase of emotional experience, but
have rarely been compared in experimental studies. Mindfulness has been found to be more
effective than distraction or rumination in reducing experimentally-induced dysphoric mood
(Broderick, 2005) and more effective than distraction in reducing exposure distress in a sample
of individuals with OCD (Wahl, Huelle, Zurowski, & Kordon, 2013). Long-term use of
distraction and mindfulness were broadly comparable in a sample of individuals with depression,
and both were more effective in improving mood than habitual rumination (Huffziger &
Kuehner, 2009). By comparing two strategies that are hypothesized to occur at the same phase of
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emotional experience, the current study will add to existing literature regarding their
comparability.
An additional focus of this study will be the efficacy of emotion regulation strategies to
reduce mood-related interference on several cognitive tasks: assessing attention (a computerized
continuous performance test), processing speed (Coding subtest of the Repeatable Battery for the
Assessment of Neuropsychological Status), and emotional interference (emotional Stroop task).
While there is existing support for the hypothesis that negative mood will have a detrimental
effect on attention and processing speed (Cannity, 2013; Cornblatt, Lenzenweger, & ErlenmeyerKimling, 1989; Gualtieri, Johnson, & Benedict, 2006; Nelson, Sax, & Strakowski, 1998;
Sévigny, Everett, & Grondin, 2003; Tsourtos, Thompson, & Stough, 2002), and the research on
the effect of negative mood on the emotional Stroop paradigm is equivocal, the effects of
emotional regulation on these tasks has yet to be examined.
The current study will examine the ability of two emotion regulation strategies to reduce
inference on cognitive tasks, following a negative mood induction. Based on previous research, it
is likely that mindfulness and distraction have differential impacts on attentional focus and
cognitive processing (e.g. Wahl et al., 2013). The current study combines research from clinical
and cognitive psychology to evaluate whether emotion regulation training can have a significant
impact on attention, visual, and verbal processes, an area of the field that is only beginning to be
explored. More broadly, this study will examine one facet of how mood affects cognition and
whether short-term training can affect this relationship.
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Hypotheses
1. Participants in the mindfulness condition will perform significantly better on the
continuous performance test than those in the distraction and control conditions.
2. Participants in the mindfulness condition will complete the Stroop paradigm more
quickly and with fewer errors than individuals in the distraction condition.
3. Participants in the mindfulness condition will perform significantly better on the
symbol-digit coding test than those in the distraction and control conditions.
4. Participants in all three conditions will report similar levels of initial negative
emotion after the negative mood film induction, but those emotions will reduce more
quickly in subjects in the mindfulness condition, as demonstrated by visual analog
mood rating scales pre- and post-mood induction and post-test.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHOD
Participants
Seventy-five non-depressed participants were recruited from undergraduate introductory
psychology classes at a large Southeastern university. Participants were assessed for depression
based on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and the Anxiety
Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS-IV; DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). To be included in
the study, participants had to be at least 18 years of age and have minimal symptoms of
depression (BDI-II < 14), no current diagnosis of depression (ADIS-IV), no current diagnosis
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (self-reported), no current gross cognitive impairment
(MMSE < 24; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), no current anti-depressant, anti-anxiety, or
stimulant medication use (self-reported), and no current engagement in psychotherapy (selfreported). These exclusion criteria screen out individuals who may experience increased or
decreased emotional or cognitive interference not due to the experimental manipulation. Of the
98 participants who signed up for the experiment, 23 were excluded due to not meeting study
criteria. Participants provided consent to participate in the study, and the research protocol was
approved by the university Institutional Review Board. Students received research credit for their
participation.
The sample included 75 participants: 36 males (48%) and 39 females (52%), with an
average age of 19.1 (SD = 1.05) and education level of 12.6 years (SD = 0.90). Ethnic
distribution of participants was 76% Caucasian (n = 57), 8% African-American (n = 6), 1%
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Hispanic (n = 1), 9% Asian-American (n = 7), 1% Indian/Middle-Eastern (n = 1), and 4% Mixed
Race/Ethnicity (n = 3). Marital status included 57% single (n = 43) and 43% dating (n = 32).
Participants were randomly assigned to complete either a mindfulness training (n = 25), a
distraction training (n = 25), or no instruction (n = 25). Descriptive statistics of demographic
information are presented in Table 1 [see Appendix]. Groups did not differ as a function of age
[F (2,72) = 0.33, p = .72], gender [X2 (2) = 4.17, p = .13], ethnicity [X2 (3) = 11.32, p = .33],
relationship status [X2 (2) = 4.03, p = .13], sexual orientation [X2 (6) = 4.03, p = .67], education
level [X2 (6) = 1.82, p = .94], grade point average [X2 (8) = 4.42, p =.82], religious affiliation [X2
(10) = 6.67, p = .76], family income [X2 (10) = 6.68, p = .76], living situation [X2 (12) = 9.59, p
= .65], or pre-test anxiety [F (2,72) = 0.60, p = .55]. Pre-test sadness differed by treatment
condition [F (2,72) = 4.64, p = .01]; participants in the distraction condition reported
significantly higher levels of sadness than those in the mindfulness [t (48) = -2.01, p = .05] and
no-instruction conditions [t (48) = 2.84, p < .01]. Pre-test happiness also showed a trend towards
lower happiness ratings by individuals in the distraction condition [F (2,72) = 2.17, p = .12]
compared to the mindfulness condition [t (48) = 2.44, p = .02]. However, there was no difference
between pre-test happiness ratings between the distraction and no-instruction conditions [t (48) =
-0.89, p = .38]. Pre-test sadness and happiness were controlled for in additional analyses.
As shown in Table 1, groups did not differ on pre-experimental self-report measures of
depression [F (2,72) = 0.85, p = .43], general anxiety [F (2,72) = 0.19, p = .83], ADHD
symptoms [F (2,72) = 0.48, p = .62], or problems with emotion regulation [F (2,72) = 0.25, p =
.78]. There were no significant between-group differences in adherence to the emotion regulation
training and negative mood induction films, as assessed by observer ratings of participant
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interference behavior, off-task behavior, motor movement, energy level, and attention.
Descriptive statistics of behavioral observations are presented in Table 2 [see Appendix]. In
addition, groups did not differ on familiarity with the negative mood induction films [Bambi: X2
(6) = 3.84, p = .70; The Champ: X2 (4) = 5.41, p = .25], the emotion regulation strategy of
mindfulness [X2 (6) = 1.84, p = .93], or the emotion regulation strategy of distraction [X2 (6) =
0.51, p = 1.00] as evaluated by post-test self-report.
Assessment Measures
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; DiNardo et al., 1994). The
ADIS-IV is a semi-structured interview that comprehensively assesses all anxiety and mood
disorders. For this study, only the current major depression and dysthymia modules were
administered. The ADIS-IV has good-to-excellent interrater reliability (range of κs = .67-.86)
and convergent validity with other indices of anxiety and depression (Brown, Campbell,
Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001).
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II is a 21item self-report measure which assesses the severity of depressive symptoms over the past two
weeks. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (range = 0-63) with higher scores suggesting
increased depression severity. Sample items include assessment of negative mood, crying, and
difficulty concentrating. This scale exhibits excellent internal consistency (α = 0.92 for
outpatient samples; 0.93 for nonclinical samples) and test-retest reliability (one-week: r = .93;
Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996), as well as strong convergent validity with the Hamilton
Psychiatric Rating Scale for Depression. The instrument also has excellent psychometric
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properties among depressed younger and older adults (Nezu, Ronan, Meadows, & McClure,
2000). In the current study, internal consistency was moderate (α = .67).
Trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The Trait subscale of the STAI assesses chronic symptoms of
anxiety, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety (range = 20 – 80). The 20-item self-report
measure uses Likert-type items, with values ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so).
Items include “I feel nervous or restless” or “I worry too much over something that doesn’t really
matter.” The internal consistency of the STAI is very good (α = .88-.92; Spielberger, Gorsuch, &
Lushene, 1970). In the current study, internal consistency was good (α = .77).
Barkley Adult ADHD Rating Scale – IV (BAARS-IV: Barkley, 2011). The BAARS-IV is
a 30-item self-report measure of current symptoms of attentional problems, including subscales
related to inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and slowed cognitive tempo. The scale includes
Likert-type items, with values ranging from 1 (never or rarely) to 4 (very often). Items include
“difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or fun activities” and “fidget with hands or feet or squirm
in seat.” This scale exhibits excellent internal consistency (α = 0.91) and test-retest reliability
(two to three weeks: r = .75; Barkley, 2011). In the current study, internal consistency was good
overall (α = .87) and moderate for all subscales (α = .58-.80).
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS: Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS is a
36-item self-report measure of emotion regulation abilities, including subscales assessing
awareness, acceptance, goal-directedness, and regulation of emotion. The scale includes Likerttype items, with responses ranging from 1 (almost never; 0-10% of the time) to 5 (almost always;
91-100% of the time). Items include “I pay attention to how I feel” and “When I’m upset, I
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believe that wallowing in it is all I can do.” Higher scores on this scale indicate greater difficulty
with emotion regulation. This scale has demonstrated high internal consistency (overall α = .93;
all subscales α > .80) and moderate to good test-retest reliability (four to eight weeks: overall r =
.88; subscales r = .57-.89; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). In the current study, internal consistency was
good (α = .85).
Continuous Performance Test (CPT). The CPT is a computerized measure of sustained
attention and impulsivity. The current study used three three-minute blocks of stimuli
presentation for a total time of nine minutes. Participants were instructed to attend to letters
presented one at a time on the screen and to press the left mouse button following a letter being
presented twice in a row (a target). For the current study, approximate 33% of items were targets
(180 items), while 67% of items were non-targets (360 items). This task provides measures of
correct detections, omission errors (failure to respond to a target), commission errors (responding
to a non-target), perseveration errors (responding to a non-target following a target presentation),
delayed omission errors, and delayed repetition errors. Versions of the continuous performance
test have demonstrated moderate to good split-half reliability (r = .72-.90; Halperin, Sharma,
Greenblatt, & Schwartz, 1991; Pollock, 2014) and test-retest reliability (r = .55-.84; Conners,
2004; Raz, Bar-Haim, Sadeh, & Dan, 2014).
Stroop Test – Emotional variant (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Stroop, 1935). The Stroop
Test is a widely used verbal color naming task which assesses reaction time and inhibition
abilities. The standard administration of the test contains three conditions: naming the color of a
series of shapes, reading a series of color words, and naming the color of text of a series of color
words (some which are congruent with their text color and some which are incongruent; (Killian,
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1985). A variation on this test – which includes an additional condition requiring naming the
color of text of a series of depression-related words – has been found to show increased reaction
time in individuals with depression, compared to healthy controls (Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib
& McCann, 1984). The procedure used in the current study is adapted from the Stroop paradigm
of Golden and Freshwater (2002) and the emotional variant of Klieger and Cordner (1990). This
version of the task contains five conditions: word reading, color naming, traditional Stroop,
Stroop task with neutral words, and Stroop task with depressive words. Each subtask contains
100 items, arranged in rows of 10, in randomly generated order, with no color or word allowed to
follow itself in a row. The word lists for the Emotional Stroop items, adapted from Klieger and
Cordner (1990), was selected as highly self-descriptive by a sample of depressed individuals
(Gotlib & McCann, 1984). The neutral word list was developed by matching the depressive word
list by word length, same first letter, and similar frequency of use in the English language (See
Table 3). Presentation of the neutral- and depressive-word subtasks were counter-balanced to
reduce practice effects. Variables generated by this task include completion time for each
subtask, number of self-corrections, and number of errors.
Coding Subtest of the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological
Status (RBANS; Randolph, 2012). The RBANS is a brief screening measure that assesses a
variety of neuropsychological functions, including attention, language, visuospatial abilities, and
immediate and delayed memory. This battery is available in four different forms, allowing for
repeatable testing. The Coding subtest is based on the digit-symbol coding paradigm that is
commonly used in neuropsychological assessment, and this task has been shown to be sensitive
to negative mood (Cannity, 2013). The RBANS has demonstrated adequate test-retest
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Table 3. Word Lists Used for Emotional Stroop Task.
Neutral Words
Depressive Words
SAT*
SAD
LIVELY
LONELY
HARMLESS
HOPELESS
GENTLY
GUILTY
FOLLOWS
UNHAPPY
UTILITY
DISCOURAGED
DISPOSITION
GLOOMY
GAMBLE
DISMAL
DRAWER
DEPRESSED
DISGUISED
FAILURE
* The word “son,” used in Klieger and Cordner (1990), was replaced for the current study due to
a strong associated with the subject of the film used for negative mood induction.

reliability between two forms of the test (r = .56-.84; Gold, Queern, Iannone, & Buchanan, 1999;
Strunk, Sutton, & Skadeland, 2010). The Coding subtest has demonstrated good convergent
validity with other forms of the symbol-digit coding paradigm (r = .78-.83; McKay, Casey,
Wertheimer, & Fitchenberg, 2007; Pachet, 2007). Participants have 90 seconds to complete the
task, and age-normed variables generated by this task include completion time, as well as
number of correct and incorrect responses.
Emotion Regulation Training Task
Participants were randomly assigned to either the mindfulness condition, the distraction
condition, or no-instruction condition. These instructions were adapted from a method used a
prior study (Wahl et al., 2013). All participants were given a series of three instructions,
presented in text and verbally, and asked to focus on and think about each item individually (See
Table 3). The first instruction was presented for one minute, the second for two minutes, and the
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third for three minutes. In the mindfulness condition, they received statements about being aware
and nonjudgmental of their emotional experience. In the distraction condition, instructions
directed participants to use other thoughts to distance themselves from their experience. In the
no-instruction condition, participants saw a series of three statements instructing them to
“Continue waiting for the next task.” Completion of each procedure took approximately 6
minutes. Participants received a booster presentation of the instructions for their condition
following the practice film. For the booster presentation, the first instruction was presented for
30 seconds, the second for one minute, and the third for 1.5 minutes. Completion of the booster
procedure took three minutes.

Table 4. Instructions for Three Conditions of Emotion Regulation Training Task.
Mindfulness Condition
Distraction Condition
No-Instruction Condition
1. Thoughts are
thoughts and not
facts.
2. Become aware of
your thoughts at this
moment.
3. Let your thoughts
pass by like clouds
in the sky.

1. At this moment,
your thoughts are
causing you distress.
2. Distract yourself
from your thoughts.
3. Silently count
backwards by
sevens from 700
(i.e. 700, 693,
686…)

1. Continue waiting
for the next task.
2. Continue waiting
for the next task.
3. Continue waiting
for the next task.

Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either the mindfulness condition, the
distraction condition, or the no-instruction condition. After providing informed consent and
demographic information and completing pre-test questionnaires, subjects were asked to provide
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visual analog scale ratings of current level of sadness, happiness, and anxious mood. Participants
then received written and verbal instructions to use either mindfulness, distraction, or noinstruction in regulating their emotions. Next, subjects viewed the first film (Scene of mother
deer dying from Bambi; Stallings et al., 2011), after which they completed another set of visual
analog scales of mood. Then, participants received the booster instructions and saw the second
film (Scene of father dying from The Champ: Lovell & Zeffirelli, 1979), and afterwards, they
repeated the visual analog scale ratings described above. Both film clips have been used
extensively in mood-induction research and have been shown to create temporary feelings of
sadness (Gross & Levenson, 1995).
Following the emotion regulation instructions and negative mood induction films,
participants completed a cognitive assessment battery, which included the emotionally valenced
Stroop task, a computerized continuous performance test, and the Coding subtest of the RBANS.
The sequence of tasks was counterbalanced to prevent order effects. These tasks were chosen
because they represent a variety of domains thought to be affected by negative mood, which is
hypothesized to be mitigated to a greater or lesser degree by the emotional regulation strategies
provided. After completing all tasks, participants were asked to provide a third series of visual
analog scales assessing sadness, happiness, and anxiety. Following this, all subjects received the
brief distraction instructions to reduce any existing negative affect. All participants received a
debriefing explaining the purpose of the study and were provided with referrals for support
services.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS
Bivariate Correlations
Descriptive data and Pearson Product-Moment correlations among all study pre-test selfreport measures are presented in Table 5 [see Appendix]. Statistically significant relationships
were noted among all self-report measures, including depression (BDI-II), anxiety (STAI),
ADHD symptoms (BAARS-IV), and emotion regulation difficulties (DERS). In addition,
participants’ pre-test rating of sadness and anxiety were also significantly positively correlated
with all self-report measures. As expected, pre-test self-ratings of happiness were significantly
negatively correlated with all self-report measures and with pre-test self-ratings of sadness and
anxiety.
Mood Induction
Descriptive data for self-ratings of mood are presented in Table 6 [see Appendix]. There
was a significant effect for time across all three visual analog scales of mood: sadness [F (3,71) =
59.38, p < .01], happiness [F (3,71) = 27.75, p < .01], and anxiety [F (3,71) = 8.29, p < .01]. The
negative mood induction was successful in increasing self-reported sadness between pre-test and
post-mood induction [t (74) = -9.38, p < .01]. Self-reported happiness decreased significantly
between pre-test and post-mood induction [t (74) = 6.69, p < .01]. Interestingly, self-reported
anxiety also decreased significantly between pre-test and post-mood induction [t (74) = 2.85, p =
.01].
The negative mood induction effect reduced by the end of the cognitive testing battery,
such that sadness was significantly lower between post-mood induction and post-cognitive
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battery [t (74) = 8.06, p < .01]. Self-reported happiness increased significantly between postmood induction and post-cognitive battery [t (74) = -5.07, p < .01]. Interestingly, self-reported
anxiety increased significantly between post-mood induction and post-cognitive battery [t (74) =
-3.88, p < .01]. Self-reported level of sadness remained significantly higher than baseline
following the cognitive battery [t (74) = -2.85, p < .01]. Happiness also remained significantly
lower than baseline following the cognitive battery [t (74) = 3.06, p < .01]. However, anxiety had
returned to baseline by the end of the cognitive battery [t (74) = -0.91, p = .37].
There were several notable differences between groups on visual analog scale (VAS)
ratings of sadness, happiness, or anxiety over time. There was a trend towards a time by
condition interaction for self-reported sadness [F (3,71) = 1.92, p = .08]; participants in the
distraction condition showed a somewhat different pattern of sadness ratings over time compared
to those in the no-instruction condition [F (3,71) = 2.45, p = .07]. Further, individuals in the
distraction condition showed significantly greater pre-test rating of sadness compared to the
mindfulness and no-instruction conditions [F (2,72) = 4.64, p = .01].
There was a significant time by condition interaction for self-report of happiness as well
[F (3,71) = 2.59, p = .02]. The pattern of happiness ratings over time was significantly different
for individuals in the mindfulness condition compared to those in the distraction condition [F
(5,69) = 3.45, p < .01]. Individuals in the mindfulness condition showed higher pre-test ratings of
happiness compared to the distraction condition [t (48) = 2.44, p = .02]. Also, participants in the
mindfulness condition maintained significantly higher VAS ratings of happiness through the
negative mood induction compared to those in the distraction condition [t (48) = 2.66, p = .01].
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Cognitive Performance
Overall descriptive data for scores on the cognitive battery can be found in Table 7 [see
Appendix]. Descriptive data on cognitive performance by condition are presented in Table 8 [see
Appendix]. Pearson Product-Moment correlations among all study pre-test self-report measures
and cognitive tasks are presented in Table 9 [see Appendix].
Cognitive performance varied by condition across several variables, when controlling for
pre-test sadness and pre-test happiness. There was a trend towards a higher percentage of correct
detections in the mindfulness condition compared to the distraction condition [F (3,46) = 2.26, p
= .09] and the no-instruction condition [F (3,45) = 2.70, p = .06]. There was a trend towards
between-groups difference on percentage of delayed repetition errors [F (4,70) = 2.13, p = .09].
Participants in the mindfulness condition had a lower percentage of delayed repetition errors than
individuals in the no-instruction condition [F (3,45) = 3.28, p = .03]. There was also a trend
towards a lower percentage of omission errors by participants in the mindfulness condition
compared to the distraction condition [F (3,46) = 2.26, p = .09] and the no-instruction condition
[F (3,45) = 2.70, p = .06].
There also were significant between-group differences in Stroop task performance. There
was a trend towards fewer errors on the Word Reading card by participants in the mindfulness
condition compared to those in the distraction condition [F (3,46) = 2.23, p = .10]. On the Color
Naming card, there was a trend towards slower total time to completion by participants in the
distraction condition compared to those in the no-instruction condition [F (3,45) = 2.41, p = .08].
Self-corrections on the Color Naming card varied significantly between groups [F (4,70) = 2.75,
p = .04]; participants in the mindfulness condition made significantly fewer self-corrections than
40

those in the no-instruction condition [F (3,45) = 2.79, p = .05]. There was a similar trend towards
fewer self-corrections on this card by subjects in the mindfulness condition than those in the
distraction condition [F (3,46) = 2.39, p = .08].
On the traditional Stroop card, there was a significant between-groups difference in total
time to completion [F (4,70) = 2.64, p = .04]. Participants in the no-instruction condition were
significantly slower than those in the mindfulness condition [F (3,45) = 3.07, p = .04] and the
distraction condition [F (3,45) = 5.21, p < .01]. Performance on the Neutral card of this task
revealed slower time to completion by those in the no-instruction condition compared to the
distraction condition [F (3,45) = 3.01, p = .04]. On the Depressive card, there was a significant
between-groups difference in total time to completion [F (4,70) = 2.67, p = .04]. Participants in
the no-instruction condition were significantly slower to complete the card than those in the
mindfulness condition [F (3,45) = 2.88, p = .05] and the distraction condition [F (3,45) = 3.52, p
= .02]. In addition, there was a trend towards individuals in the mindfulness condition making
fewer self-corrections than those in the distraction condition [F (3,46) = 2.42, p = .08] and the
no-instruction condition [F (3,45) = 2.20, p = .10].
On the Coding task, there was a trend towards higher scaled scores by individuals in the
no-instruction condition compared to the distraction condition [F (3,45) = 2.29, p = .09].
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
The current study examined the effect of emotion regulation on reducing cognitive
burden during attention tasks. Overall, there was a general trend towards better cognitive
performance after a negative mood induction by participants who received a brief mindfulness
training compared to those who received a brief distraction training or no emotion regulation
training. In addition, results provide limited support for a buffering effect of mindfulness in
reducing a dip in happiness following a negative mood induction. These findings represent a step
towards integrating literature on the effects of negative mood on cognition, as well as the
interaction of mood and emotion regulation.
One goal of the current study was to understand the trajectory of emotional experience
following brief mindfulness or distraction training and a negative mood induction in healthy
individuals. The film mood induction used in this task was successful in eliciting sadness in
participants and decreasing happiness – effects which are commensurate with other studies using
this paradigm (Goldin et al., 2005; Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, &
Gotlib, 2002). Over time, the negative mood induction abated somewhat. Interestingly, subjects’
ratings of anxiety decreased following the sadness-inducing films, but increased to baseline
during the cognitive testing battery. This pattern has been seen in some studies (e.g. Parrot &
Sabini, 1990) but not in others (e.g. Sutherland, Newman, & Rachman, 1982). While anxiety was
not a focus of the mood induction, it is possible that the mood induction created a “bottleneck,”
which directed emotional resources towards the target emotion of sadness and away from the
more tangential experience of anxiety. In sum, the mood induction was effective in increasing
negative affect and decreasing positive affect for all experimental conditions.
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However, results indicate that mindfulness and distraction training may have influenced
the pattern of emotion participants experienced over the course of the experiment. There was a
trend towards significantly different patterns of sadness over time for the distraction condition
compared to the no-instruction condition. Also, there was a trend towards a different pattern of
happiness ratings over time for the mindfulness condition compared to the distraction condition.
These data provide tentative support for an altered pattern of emotional experience after a
negative mood induction for individuals trained in mindfulness, as opposed to those trained in
distraction or those who receive no training. However, a confounding factor in this study were
significant pre-test differences in sadness and happiness between treatment conditions. While
these results provide tentative support for the experimental hypothesis that mindfulness would
influence the course of emotional experience during the study, conclusions are limited by
unexpected between-group differences despite random assignment. Results of the current study
support previous findings, but future studies would benefit from methodology that is further able
to demonstrate differential effects of mindfulness training from distraction or other emotion
regulation training strategies.
In accordance with study hypotheses, participants who received brief mindfulness
training showed a trend towards better performance on correct detections, omission errors, and
delayed repetition errors during a continuous performance test. These findings are consistent
with previous research documenting the positive effects of long-term mindfulness training on
sustained attention (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008). Between-group differences in continuous
performance test results suggest a differential effect due to the mindfulness training, but several
issues limit the conclusions that can be made. Post-hoc power analyses on CPT variables suggest
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that a sample size of approximately 165 participants would be needed to detect the estimated
effect. While numerous studies have demonstrated the deleterious effects of negative mood on
sustained attention (Cornblatt, Lenzenweger, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1989; Gualtieri, Johnson,
& Benedict, 2006; Nelson, Sax, & Strakowski, 1998; Sévigny, Everett, & Grondin, 2003), in the
current study, the efficacy of the mindfulness training over the distraction or no-instruction
conditions in reducing negative affect is confounded by pre-test between-group differences in
sadness and happiness ratings. Despite these limitations, results provide limited support of study
hypotheses and previous research on the influence of emotion regulation on the relationship
between mood and sustained attention.
On the emotionally valenced Stroop paradigm, several between-groups differences
emerged. Participants in the distraction condition demonstrated a trend towards slower time to
completion on the Color Naming card, while those in the no-instruction condition showed a trend
towards slower completion time on the traditional Stroop, neutral, and depressive cards.
Participants in the mindfulness condition showed a trend towards fewer errors on the Word
Reading card and fewer self-corrections on the Color Naming and Depressive cards.
These findings did not support the hypothesis that mindfulness training would lead to
quicker time to completion than the distraction condition. However, it may be that emotion
regulation training in general contributes to quicker performance, while those who received no
instruction utilize strategies that are less efficient or create greater cognitive interference.
Interestingly, one consistent finding was fewer self-corrections by those in the mindfulness
condition compared to the distraction and no-instruction conditions. These results provide
limited support for the hypothesis that those in the mindfulness condition would make fewer
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errors than those in the distraction or no-instruction conditions. Little research has examined the
meaning of self-corrections on an inhibition task like the Stroop paradigm, but it may be that
flexibility and awareness are facilitated in mindfulness, which reduces the likelihood of making
errors and needing to self-correct.
To further understand these findings, future studies would benefit from a larger sample
size to provide more conclusive evidence to support these conclusions. A post-hoc power
analysis suggests that a sample size of approximately 169 would be necessary to detect the
effects of variables of the emotionally valenced Stroop task. In the current study, pre-existing
between-group differences makes it difficult to determine whether between-group differences in
mood caused problems in cognitive performance. An additional direction for future studies
would be to consolidate findings on the effects of mood and emotion regulation on the
emotionally valenced Stroop, as previous work has been inconclusive about whether negative
mood has a deleterious effect on performance on this task (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White,
1995; Buhle, Wager, & Smith, 2010; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, &
Mathews, 1993).
Performance on the Coding task revealed no differences in raw scores across conditions.
There was a trend towards higher scaled scores by participants in the no-instruction condition
compared to the distraction condition. These results run counter to the study hypothesis that
individuals in the mindfulness condition would show better performance than those in other
groups and goes against previous research suggesting that negative mood is associated with
slower processing speed (Cannity, 2013; Tsourtos, Thompson, & Stough, 2002). A possible
explanation for this finding is that emotion regulation has a negligible effect on processing speed
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– a more automatic cognitive process – than on more complex processes such as sustained
attention. An alternative theory is that between-group differences in mood ratings over time were
too weak to produce robust differences on this task. In the current study, examination of
differential patterns of emotional experience between groups were confounded by pre-test
between-group differences in sadness and happiness. In addition, post-hoc power analysis
suggests that a sample size of approximately 175 participants would be needed to detect the
effect size of symbol-digit coding performance. The current study does not support differential
effects of emotion regulation on performance on a symbol-digit coding task, although future
studies may be able to more clearly investigate these factors.
There are several limitations of the current study which future studies should seek to
address. A larger sample size would enable further exploration of several trends identified in the
current study. In addition, a larger sample size may eliminate between-group differences in pretest sadness and happiness, which appeared despite random assignment to experimental
condition. These differences limited interpretation of differences in patterns of emotional
experience due to emotion regulation training. Future studies may seek to examine the efficacy
of longer-term training and its effects on cognitive performance. In addition, the current study
examines two widely used emotion regulation strategies; comparisons of other strategies and of
strategies which occur at various times through the emotional experience would further inform
this area of research.
The results of the current study suggest that even a brief emotion regulation training in
mindfulness may buffer some of the effects of a negative mood induction, leading to a trend
towards improved cognitive performance on several attention tasks. This experiment provides a
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critical step towards understanding of the relationship between emotion regulation and cognitive
performance.
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics as a Function of Treatment Condition.
Mindfulness
Distraction
Characteristic
condition
condition
(n = 25)
(n = 25)
Age
19.2 years
19.1 years
(SD = 1.21)
(SD = 0.91)
Gender
Male
13 (52%)
15 (60%)
Female
12 (48%)
10 (40%)
Ethnicity/Race
White/Caucasian
18 (72%)
18 (72%)
Black/African-American
3 (12%)
3 (12%)
Hispanic/Latino
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
Asian-American
1 (4%)
2 (8%)
Indian/Middle-Eastern
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
Mixed Race/Ethnicity
2 (8%)
1 (4%)
Relationship Status
Single
11 (44%)
18 (72%)
Dating
14 (56%)
7 (28%)
Sexual Orientation
Heterosexual
23 (92%)
24 (96%)
Gay
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
Lesbian
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Bisexual
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
Other
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Education Level
12.7 years
12.5 years
(SD = 0.98)
(SD = 0.82)
Grade Point Average
1.0-1.5
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1.5-2.0
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
2.0-2.5
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
2.5-3.0
5 (20%)
8 (32%)
3.0-3.5
7 (28%)
7 (28%)
3.5-4.0
11 (44%)
9 (36%)
Religion
Catholic
4 (16%)
2 (8%)
Non-Catholic/Christian
18 (72%)
18 (72%)
Buddhist
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Hindu
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
Atheist/Agnostic
2 (8%)
4 (16%)
Other
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
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No-instruction
condition
(n=25)
18.9 years
(SD = 1.04)
8 (32%)
17 (68%)
21 (84%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
4 (16%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
14 (56%)
11 (44%)
23 (92%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
12.6 years
(SD = 0.92)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
2 (8%)
3 (12%)
9 (36%)
10 (40%)
1 (3%)
33 (87%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
2 (8%)
0 (0%)

Table 1. Continued.
Characteristic
Family Income
Less than $20,000
$20,000-40,000
$40,000-60,000
$60,000-80,000
$80,000-100,000
More than $100,000
Living Situation
Alone off campus
Alone on campus
One roommate
Two roommates
Three roommates
Four roommates
More than four
roommates
Pre-Test Sadness
Pre-Test Happiness
Pre-Test Anxiety
BDI-II
STAI
BAARS-IV
DERS
Familiarity with Bambi Film
Not at all familiar
A little familiar
Somewhat familiar
Very familiar

Mindfulness
condition
(n = 25)

Distraction
condition
(n = 25)

No-instruction
condition
(n=25)

2 (8%)
2 (8%)
4 (16%)
4 (16%)
3 (12%)
10 (40%)

2 (8%)
3 (11%)
4 (16%)
5 (20%)
2 (8%)
9 (36%)

1 (4%)
3 (12%)
0 (0%)
3 (12%)
4 (16%)
13 (52%)

1 (4%)
0 (0%)
14 (56%)
1 (4%)
7 (28%)
1 (4%)

1 (4%)
2 (8%)
11 (44%)
2 (8%)
9 (36%)
0 (0%)

1 (4%)
1 (4%)
17 (68%)
2 (8%)
4 (16%)
0 (0%)

1 (4%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

9.8
(SD = 14.10)
75.4
(SD = 16.30)
30.4
(SD = 26.87)
3.4
(SD = 2.96)
33.9
(SD = 5.66)
38.4
(SD = 5.84)
64.8
(SD = 15.70)

19.8
(SD = 18.36)
64.0
(SD = 16.79)
34.5
(SD = 25.33)
3.9
(SD = 3.52)
36.0
(SD = 6.09)
39.7
(SD = 6.77)
67.8
(SD = 12.45)

6.6
(SD = 12.16)
69.2
(SD = 24.03)
26.2
(SD = 28.70)
4.6
(SD = 3.59)
35.5
(SD = 7.13)
40.5
(SD = 10.23)
67.7
(SD = 20.9)

0 (0%)
6 (24%)
7 (28%)
12 (48%)

2 (8%)
6 (24%)
7 (28%)
8 (32%)

3 (12%)
6 (24%)
8 (32%)
8 (32%)
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Table 1. Continued.
Characteristic

Mindfulness
condition
(n = 25)

Distraction
condition
(n = 25)

No-instruction
condition
(n=25)

Familiarity with Champ
Film
Not at all familiar
22 (88%)
23 (92%)
23 (92%)
A little familiar
3 (12%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
Somewhat familiar
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
Very familiar
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
Familiarity with mindfulness
Not at all familiar
16 (64%)
14 (56%)
13 (52%)
A little familiar
6 (24%)
4 (16%)
7 (28%)
Somewhat familiar
2 (8%)
4 (16%)
4 (16%)
Very familiar
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
Familiarity with distraction
Not at all familiar
13 (52%)
11 (44%)
13 (52%)
A little familiar
6 (24%)
6 (24%)
5 (20%)
Somewhat familiar
4 (16%)
4 (16%)
4 (16%)
Very familiar
2 (8%)
2 (8%)
0 (0%)
Note. Pre-Test Sadness = Visual analog rating of sadness (range: 0-100; higher score indicates
greater sadness), Pre-Test Happiness = Visual analog rating of happiness (range: 0-100; higher
score indicates greater happiness), Pre-Test Anxiety = Visual analog rating of anxiety (range: 0100; higher score indicates greater anxiety), BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd Edition,
STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Subscale, BAARS-IV = Barkley Adult ADHD
Rating Scale, 4th Edition, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale.

80

Table 2. Participant Behavior Observations as a Function of Treatment Condition.
Mindfulness
Distraction
No-instruction
condition
condition
condition
(n = 25)
(n = 25)
(n=25)
During First Training
Interference Behaviors
M = 0.4
M = 0.4
M = 0.9
(SD = .65)
(SD = .71)
(SD = 1.55)
Off-Task Behaviors
M = 0.7
M = 0.9
M = 1.2
(SD = 1.06)
(SD = 1.71)
(SD = 1.80)
Motor Movement:
Normal activity level
19 (76%)
20 (80%)
16 (64%)
Shifts position frequently
6 (24%)
4 (16%)
9 (36%)
Slowed motor activity
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
Energy Level:
Alert
23 (92%)
20 (80%)
20 (80%)
Fatigued/poor endurance
2 (8%)
3 (12%)
4 (16%)
Overactive/impulsive
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)
Attention:
Maintains full attention
19 (76%)
18 (72%)
16 (64%)
Needs 1 redirection
6 (24%)
5 (20%)
3 (12%)
Needs 2 redirections
0 (0%)
2 (8%)
5 (20%)
Fully inattentive
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
During First Film
Interference Behaviors
Off-Task Behaviors
Motor Movement:
Normal activity level
Shifts position frequently
Slowed motor activity
Energy Level:
Alert
Fatigued/poor endurance
Overactive/impulsive
Attention:
Maintains full attention
Needs 1 redirection
Needs 2 redirections
Fully inattentive

M = 0.0
(SD = .20)
M = 0.0
(SD = .00)

M = 0.0
(SD = .00)
M = 0.0
(SD = .20)

M = 0.0
(SD = .20)
M = 0.0
(SD = .20)

22 (88%)
2 (8%)
1 (4%)

25 (100%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

25 (100%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

23 (92%)
2 (8%)
1 (4%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)

23 (92%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

25 (100%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
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Table 2. Continued.

During Second Training
Interference Behaviors
Off-Task Behaviors
Motor Movement:
Normal activity level
Shifts position frequently
Slowed motor activity
Energy Level:
Alert
Fatigued/poor endurance
Overactive/impulsive
Attention:
Maintains full attention
Needs 1 redirection
Needs 2 redirections
Fully inattentive
During Target Film
Interference Behaviors
Off-Task Behaviors
Motor Movement:
Normal activity level
Shifts position frequently
Slowed motor activity
Energy Level:
Alert
Fatigued/poor endurance
Overactive/impulsive
Attention:
Maintains full attention
Needs 1 redirection
Needs 2 redirections
Fully inattentive

Mindfulness
condition
(n = 25)

Distraction
condition
(n = 25)

No-instruction
condition
(n=25)

M = 0.2
(SD = .50)
M = 0.8
(SD = 1.08)

M = 0.8
(SD = 1.08)
M = 0.8
(SD = 1.56)

M = 0.4
(SD = 1.12)
M = 1.2
(SD = 2.53)

17 (71%)
6 (25%)
1 (4%)

19 (76%)
6 (24%)
0 (0%)

22 (88%)
3 (12%)
0 (0%)

21 (84%)
3 (12%)
0 (0%)

18 (72%)
6 (24%)
1 (4%)

19 (76%)
4 (16%)
1 (4%)

19 (76%)
3 (12%)
0 (0%)
2 (8%)

20 (80%)
3 (12%)
0 (0%)
2 (8%)

19 (76%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
4 (16%)

M = 0.0
(SD = .00)
M = 0.0
(SD = .00)

M = 0.0
(SD = .20)
M = 0.1
(SD = .28)

M = 0.0
(SD = .20)
M = 0.0
(SD = .20)

23 (92%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

23 (92%)
2 (8%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)

24 (96%)
0 (0%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
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Table 5. Correlations and Descriptive Data for Self-Report Instruments.
Instrument
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
SD
1. Pre-Sad
---.46** .44** .32** .35**
.24*
.30** 11.8 15.82
2. Pre-Hap
---.28* -.40** -.52** -.25* -.53** 69.6 19.67
3. Pre-Anx
--.33** .47** .37** .46** 30.4 26.86
4. BDI-II
--.64** .38** .43**
4.0
3.36
5. STAI
--.61** .63** 35.1
6.30
6. BAARS
--.40** 39.5
7.79
7. DERS
--66.8 16.56
Note. Pre-Sad = Visual analog rating of sadness (range: 0-100; higher score indicates greater
sadness), Pre-Happy = Visual analog rating of happiness (range: 0-100; higher score indicates
greater happiness), Pre-Anx = Visual analog rating of anxiety (range: 0-100; higher score
indicates greater anxiety), BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd Edition, STAI = State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory, Trait Subscale, BAARS-IV = Barkley Adult ADHD Rating Scale, 4th
Edition, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale.
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level.
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 6. Mood Ratings Across Time.
Sadness
M (SD)

Happiness
M (SD)

Anxiety
M (SD)

Pre-Test

11.8 (15.82)

69.6 (19.67)

30.4 (26.9)

Mid-Film Induction

34.8 (24.56)

55.4 (20.12)

24.3 (24.20)

Post-Film Induction

43.3 (28.50)

51.5 (24.23)

24.1 (24.73)

Post-Cognitive Battery

17.6 (17.83)

64.2 (20.85)

32.4 (27.49)

Time Point
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Table 7. Descriptive Data for Cognitive Battery.
Test/Subscores

M (SD)

Continuous Performance Test
Correct Detections (%)
Omission Errors (%)
Commission Errors (%)
Perseverative Commission Errors (%)
Delayed Omission Errors (%)
Delayed Repetition Errors (%)
Correct Detections (MSec)
Commission Errors (MSec)
Perseverative Commission Errors (MSec)
Delayed Omission Errors (MSec)
Delayed Repetition Errors (MSec)
Emotional Stroop Task
Word Reading
Total Time
Total Errors
Self-Corrections
Color Naming
Total Time
Total Errors
Self-Corrections
Stroop Task
Total Time
Total Errors
Self-Corrections
Neutral Card
Total Time
Total Errors
Self-Corrections
Depressive Card
Total Time
Total Errors
Self-Corrections
Coding
Raw Score
Scaled Score
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94.5 (4.94)
5.5 (4.94)
1.4 (1.59)
0.2 (1.04)
0.0 (0.00)
3.2 (3.84)
482.8 (64.0)
342.3 (132.7)
49.4 (149.45)
0.0 (0.00)
231.9 (225.67)

43.5 (7.90)
0.1 (0.23)
0.5 (0.92)
56.9 (10.46)
0.2 (.40)
0.7 (0.82)
91.7 (23.38)
0.7 (1.06)
1.7 (1.61)
69.4 (14.89)
0.2 (0.46)
0.6 (0.85)
76.0 (17.33)
0.2 (0.57)
0.8 (0.92)
54.8 (8.18)
10.3 (2.69)

Table 8. Descriptive Data for Cognitive Battery by Condition.
Mindfulness
Test/Subscores
M (SD)
Continuous Performance Test
Correct Detections (%)
95.5 (4.28)
Omission Errors (%)
4.5 (4.28)
Commission Errors (%)
1.3 (0.99)
Perseverative Commission Errors (%)
0.0 (0.11)
Delayed Omission Errors (%)
0.0 (0.00)
Delayed Repetition Errors (%)
3.4 (2.82)
Correct Detections (MSec)
473.4 (56.27)
Commission Errors (MSec)
355.9 (125.89)
Perseverative Commission Errors (MSec)
10.0 (49.80)
Delayed Omission Errors (MSec)
0.0 (0.00)
Delayed Repetition Errors (MSec)
299.2 (220.15)
Emotional Stroop Task
Word Reading
Total Time
43.3 (7.96)
Total Errors
0.0 (0.00)
Self-Corrections
0.5 (0.92)
Color Naming
Total Time
56.0 (11.65)
Total Errors
0.2 (0.52)
Self-Corrections
0.5 (0.51)
Stroop Task
Total Time
91.0 (24.34)
Total Errors
0.4 (0.71)
Self-Corrections
1.5 (1.19)
Neutral Card
Total Time
69.8 (14.79)
Total Errors
0.2 (0.37)
Self-Corrections
0.6 (0.82)
Depressive Card
Total Time
74.5 (13.78)
Total Errors
0.1 (0.44)
Self-Corrections
0.5 (0.77)
Coding
Raw Score
53.9 (8.21)
Scaled Score
9.9 (2.91)
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Distraction
M (SD)

No-Instruction
M (SD)

94.7 (3.17)
5.4 (3.17)
1.7 (2.15)
0.5 (1.77)
0.0 (0.00)
3.7 (5.24)
480.6 (58.07)
341.4 (116.34)
103.0 (215.78)
0.0 (0.00)
209.0 (213.12)

93.5 (6.68)
6.5 (6.68)
1.32 (1.44)
0.1 (0.25)
0.0 (0.00)
2.4 (3.00)
494.4 (76.41)
329.5 (156.63)
35.3 (122.5)
0.0 (0.00)
187.6 (236.30)

42.3 (5.96)
0.0 (0.20)
0.4 (1.04)

44.9 (9.56)
0.1 (0.33)
0.6 (0.81)

57.8 (8.93)
0.1 (0.33)
0.8 (0.99)

56.8 (10.98)
0.1 (0.33)
0.8 (0.85)

90.7 (17.51)
0.9 (1.54)
1.7 (1.51)

93.3 (27.97)
0.7 (0.69)
2.0 (2.02)

69.1 (9.79)
0.2 (0.52)
0.6 (0.87)

69.5 (19.20)
0.2 (0.47)
0.6 (0.91)

76.4 (10.19)
0.3 (0.84)
1.0 (0.89)

77.1 (25.06)
0.1 (0.28)
0.8 (1.03)

55.2 (8.79)
10.3 (2.62)

55.2 (7.77)
10.8 (2.57)

Table 9. Correlations Among Self-Report Instruments and Cognitive Battery Scores.
PrePreTask/ Subtest
BDI-II BAARS
STAI
DERS
Sad
Happy
CPT
CorrDetect (%)
-.05
-.24*
-.09
-.06
-.18
.00
OmErr (%)
.05
.24*
.09
.06
.18
.00
ComErr (%)
-.03
.05
.00
.04
.16
-.04
PersComErr (%)
-.06
.00
-.03
-.02
.05
-.01
DelOmErr (%)
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
DelRepErr (%)
-.09
.10
.06
.05
.30*
-.02
CorrDetect (MS)
-.07
.01
-.11
-.11
-.08
.21
ComErr (MS)
-.04
.10
-.07
.09
.14
-.05
PersComErr (MS)
.14
-.09
.05
.04
.12
-.08
DelOmErr (MS)
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
DelRepErr (MS)
.01
.14
.12
-.02
.20
.10
Emotional Stroop
Word Reading
Total Time
-.11
.10
.01
.17
-.02
-.07
Total Errors
-.02
-.18
-.06
-.08
-.14
-.12
Self-Corrections
.18
-.10
.01
.08
-.03
.13
Color Naming
Total Time
.02
.10
.03
.15
.25*
-.07
Total Errors
.02
-.10
.02
-.12
.04
-.15
Self-Corrections
.28*
.02
.28*
.15
.30**
-.13
Stroop Task
Total Time
-.03
.16
.02
.14
.28*
.02
Total Errors
-.04
-.05
-.03
-.02
-.10
.12
Self-Corrections
.02
-.11
-.07
-.05
.18
-.02
Neutral Card
Total Time
.03
-.03
.01
.17
.27*
-.10
Total Errors
.08
-.03
.03
.06
.10
-.01
Self-Corrections
.13
-.01
.09
.06
-.03
-.10
Depressive Card
Total Time
.04
-.04
.05
.27*
.34**
-.12
Total Errors
.28*
-.10
.02
.09
.17
-.07
Self-Corrections
.07
-.07
.01
.10
.12
.02
Coding
Raw Score
-.01
.05
-.10
-.01
-.21
.09
Scaled Score
.00
.05
-.07
.00
-.22
.08
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PreAnx
-.23*
.22*
.19
.05
.00
.18
-.22
-.06
.03
.00
.14

.25*
-.24*
.05
.26*
-.08
.12
.25*
-.10
.15
.26*
.08
.07
.26*
.04
-.02
-.10
-.14

Note. CPT = Continuous Performance Task, CorrDetect = Correct Detections, OmErr =
Omission Errors, ComErr = Commission Errors, PersComErr = Perseverative Commission
Errors, DelOmErr = Delayed Omission Errors, DelRepErr = Delayed Repetition Errors,
Pre-Sad = Visual analog rating of sadness, Pre-Happy = Visual analog rating of happiness, PreAnx = Visual analog rating of anxiety, BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd Edition, STAI =
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Subscale, BAARS-IV = Barkley Adult ADHD Rating Scale,
4th Edition, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale.
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level.
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level.
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